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 Predicting susceptibility to cyber-fraud victimhood 
Abstract 
Purpose – This paper develops a theoretical framework to predict susceptibility to 
cyber-fraud victimhood. 
Design/methodology/approach – A survey was constructed to examine whether 
personality, socio-demographic characteristics, and online routine activities predicted 
one-off and repeat victimhood of cyber-fraud. Overall, 11,780 participants completed 
a survey (one-off victims, N = 728; repeat victims = 329). 
Findings - The final saturated model revealed that psychological and socio-
demographic characteristics and online routine activities should be considered when 
predicting victimhood. Consistent with the hypotheses, victims of cyber-frauds were 
more likely to: be older, score high on impulsivity measures of urgency and sensation 
seeking, score high on addictive measures, engage in more frequent routine activities 
that place them at great risk of becoming scammed. There was little distinction 
between one-off and repeat victims of cyber-frauds. 
Originality/value – This work uniquely combines psychological, socio-demographic 
and online behaviours to develop a comprehensive theoretical framework to predict 
susceptibility to cyber-frauds. Importantly, the work here challenges the current utility 
of government websites to protect users from becoming scammed and provides 
insights into methods that might be employed to protect users from becoming 
scammed. 
Keywords Internet-security, personality, routine activity theory, cyber-fraud, 
cybersecurity, scams. 
Paper type Research paper 
 
 1. Introduction 
Cyber-frauds (also referred to as cyber-scams) are any type of fraud that exploits mass 
communication technologies (e.g., email, Instant Messenger, social networking sites) 
to trick people out of money (Whitty, 2015a). Examples include: foreign lotteries and 
sweepstakes (in which the victim believes they have won money from a lottery and 
are told to pay a fee in order to release the funds), ‘419’ scams (advance fee fraud, in 
which victims believe that for a small amount of money they will make a large 
fortune), and romance scams (taken in by a fake online dating persona, in which the 
victim sends the ‘fake persona’ money). According to governmental and academic 
reports, the numbers of scam victims appear to be on the increase on a global scale 
(ACCC, 2016, NFA, 2013, ONS, 2016a,b Whitty, 2015a, Whitty & Buchanan, 2012). 
In the UK in 2016, it was reported in the England and Wales Crime Survey that 
citizens are 10 times more likely to be robbed while at their computer by a criminal 
based overseas than to fall victim of traditional theft (ONS, 2016a). In 2015, 
Australians lost over $229 million (AUD) to scams, with 105,200 scam complaints. 
This amount was a 15% increase from 2014. The National Fraud Authority (NFA, 
2013) in the UK estimated that fraud costs in the UK equate to over £52 billion a 
year. 
Of further concern to the numbers of overall victims, is the number of victims 
who become ‘repeat victims’ of cyber-frauds. In 2016 the Office for National 
Statistics reported that in the UK 16% of fraud victims became re-scammed within the 
same 12-month crime reference period (ONS, 2016a). In a representative sample of 
2,000 UK adults it was found that in 2012 approximately 800,000 UK adults were 
defrauded by cyber-frauds in the UK and about a quarter (26%) of these victims were 
repeat victims during their lifetime (Whitty, 2015a). Understanding why people are 
 repeatedly scammed online is critical, given that these victims often suffer both 
financial and psychological harms (Button, Lewis & Tapley, 2014; Whitty, 2015a; 
Whitty & Buchanan, 2016). By studying one-off and repeat victims of cyber-frauds, 
we might be able to develop methods to substantially reduce the rates of this 
particular crime.  
The research presented in this paper draws from psychological and 
criminological theories to examine the predictors of cyber-fraud victimhood. In 
particular, the research focuses on psychological and socio-demographic 
characteristics and online behaviours that might place individuals at risk of becoming 
a victim of a cyber-fraud. In addition, the work examines whether there are 
dispositional and/or behavioural differences between one-off and repeat victims. 
 
1.1 Victims’ psychological profile  
There has been some speculation about the distinctive psychological characteristics of 
fraud victims, in general. Titus and Gover (2001) believe that victims of fraud are 
more likely to be: co-operative, greedy, gullible/uncritical, careless, susceptible to 
flattery, easily intimidated, risk takers, generous, hold respect for authority and are 
good citizens. Fischer, Lea and Evans (2013), found in their survey research that scam 
victims or near scam victims were more affected by the high values offered in scams 
and displayed a high degree of trust in the scammers. Holtfreter, Reisig and Pratt 
(2008) found that self-control is a significant predictor of victimisation. Buchanan and 
Whitty (2013) found in their research on romance scams that individuals with a higher 
tendency towards idealization of romantic partners were more likely to be scammed. 
Whitty (2013) has theorised that romance scam victims are addicted to the scam. 
Whilst more research is needed in this area, the current work suggests some merit in 
 considering whether personal dispositions predict cyber-fraud victimhood. The first 
hypothesis is therefore that victims of cyber-frauds are likely to significantly differ on 
psychological characteristics compared with non-victims of cyber-frauds (H1). 
Drawing from the previous literature on scamming compliance behaviour as 
well as the research on behaviours related to certain personality dispositions, the 
following psychological characteristics were examined: impulsivity, locus of control, 
and addictive disposition. Impulsivity was examined given that much of the literature 
that theorises why individuals become defrauded highlights the use of the scarcity 
tactic employed by criminals and their push for urgency to respond to a crisis (e.g., 
Lea, Fischer & Evans, 2009; Whitty, 2013). Victims of scams, therefore, might be 
more likely to respond to pushes to respond quickly without checking facts and be 
pulled into sensational narratives (e.g., handsome military soldiers, stuck in war torn 
areas). A subset of the first hypothesis is therefore that victims of cyber-frauds are 
likely to score higher on measures of impulsivity compared with non-victims (H1a).  
Locus of control refers to an individual’s belief about control over his/her 
environment. People who have an internal locus of control have the conviction that 
events are contingent upon one’s behaviour. Those with an external locus of control 
believe that events do not depend upon their actions, but rather upon luck, chance, or 
fate (Rotter, 1966). If individuals believe that they have little control over events, they 
might be more likely to comply with a scammer. A subset of the first hypothesis is 
therefore that victims of cyber-frauds are likely to score higher on measures of 
external locus of control compared with non-victims (H1b). 
There has been some theorizing that individuals get ‘caught up in a scam’ do 
so because they are addicted to the scam itself and the visceral response they 
experience from the involvement in the scam (Whitty, 2013; Whitty, 2015b). 
 Addictive disposition was therefore considered important to investigate in this 
research. A subset of the first hypothesis is therefore that victims of cyber-frauds are 
likely to score higher on measures of addiction compared with non-victims (H1c). 
 
1.2 Victims’ socio-demographic profile  
With respect to socio-demographic characteristics, such as age and education of fraud 
victims, in general, the literature is fairly sketchy, with much of the research focusing 
on the elderly given that it is presumed they are more at risk (e.g., ACCC, 2016; 
Bolimos & Choo, 2017; James, Boyle & Bennett, 2013; Oliver, Burls, Fenge & 
Brown, 2015, ONS, 2016, Titus & Gover, 2001). Those who report cyber-frauds tend 
to be older (ACCC, 2016) and there is a view that those who are uneducated are more 
likely to be scammed (Titus & Gover, 2001), although empirical research is needed to 
support this belief. The second hypothesis is therefore that victims of cyber-frauds are 
likely to significantly different on the socio-demographic characteristics compared 
with non-victims of cyber-frauds (H2). It is hypothesised that older people are more 
likely to become victims of cyber-frauds compared with younger people (H2a). It is 
also hypothesised that less educated people are more likely to become victims of 
cyber-frauds compared with more educated people (H2b). 
 
1.3 Routine activity theory  
The premise of routine activity theory, first proposed by Cohen and Felson (1979), is 
that crime is unaffected by social causes, such as poverty and inequality. Proponents 
of this theory argue that individuals become victims of crime because they participate 
in ‘high risk’ activities or behaviours in the absence of capable guardianship and in 
the company of motivated offenders (Farrell, Phillips & Pease, 1995; Turanovic & 
 Pratt, 2014). According to this theory, opportunity is the root cause of victimisation. 
Victims of burglary, for instance, are encouraged to change their locks and add alarm 
systems in order to decrease their chances of becoming burgled a second time.  
There are a few studies that have examined the relationship between online 
activities and cyber-fraud. Hutchings and Hayes (2009), drawing from a very small 
sample, found that computer use was a significant predictor of receiving a phishing 
email. Pratt, Holtfreter and Reisig (2010) examined whether demographic 
characteristics (e.g., age, gender, education, martial status) and online routines (hours 
spent online and Internet web site purchases) increase people’s exposure to scams. 
They found that demographic characteristics shape routine online activities and that 
indicators of routine online activities fully mediate the effect of demographic 
characteristics on the likelihood of being targeted online for fraud. Psychological 
characteristics, however, were not considered in their study. Moreover, the likelihood 
that a victim would be taken in by these scams was not considered. In more recent 
research, Reyns (2015) conducted a study that examined whether online exposure 
placed users at more risk of online victimisation (phishing, hacking and malware 
infection) and if online guardianship helped prevent this form of victimisation. He 
found that individuals who were more likely to make online purchases, engage in 
social networking and post information online were more likely to be victimised. He 
also found that online guardianship was positively related to victimisation but in the 
opposite direction to what he predicted. For example, Reyns found that individuals 
who installed anti-virus software where more likely to become a victim of a phishing 
attack, although he suspects the reason for this finding was a temporal ordering 
problem (i.e. the participants in his sample may have installed the software as a 
consequence of being phished). Therefore, although Reyns’ results were mixed, the 
 findings suggest there is a need to further investigate the relationship between online 
behaviours and online victimisation.  
Overall, research findings therefore highlight that online routine activities are 
important to investigate when examining cyber-fraud victimisation. Drawing from 
previous research the online risky activities this study focused on included: instant 
messaging, positing pictures, posting messages, streaming media, online shopping and 
online banking. It was reasoned that engaging in these activities might increase the 
likelihood that a user is likely to encounter a scam or provide personal information for 
scammers to use against that user, thereby increasing a person’s chances of being 
scammed. In addition, an item on online guardianship was included (visiting online 
sites for consumer advice, e.g., scammer alert advice). The third hypothesis is 
therefore that victims of cyber-frauds are likely to significantly differ on their 
frequency in engaging on online activities compared with non-victims of cyber-frauds 
(H3). It is further hypothesised that victims of cyber-frauds are less likely to engage in 
online guardianship behaviours compared with non-victims of cyber-frauds (H4). 
 
1.4 Repeat victims 
There is a body of academic literature on repeat victims, which has mostly focused on 
crimes, such as: burglary, theft, domestic violence, and child sexual abuse (see, for 
example, Farrell & Pease, 2001; Farrell, Phillips & Pease, 1995; Grove, Farrell, 
Farrington & Johnson, 2012). Broadly, theorists argue that repeat victimisation occurs 
because of one or more of the following: predisposing personal characteristics; 
situational risk factors; and the criminals or connected co-offenders return to the same 
victims once learning they are a suitable target (Farrell et al., 1995; Farrell & Pease, 
2001; Lantz & Ruback, 2015). Whitty (2015a) has reported that about a quarter of 
 cyber-fraud victims are scammed at least twice. This proportion of repeat victims 
suggests an urgent need to also understand why some cyber-fraud victims continue to 
be victimised by subsequent cyber-frauds. The empirical literature, to date, provides 
few clues as to why some victims learn their lessons and others move on to become 
victims of other cyber-frauds. The fifth and final hypothesis is that repeat victims of 
cyber-frauds are like to significantly differ on psychological and social characteristics, 
online behaviours and online guardianship behaviours compared with one-off victims. 
 
2. Method 
2.1 Participants 
Overall, 12,060 participants who resided in the UK were recruited from a random 
sample from a paid panel organised by ‘Qualtrics’ (a well-established company, often 
used by academics to recruit representative samples for online studies). Of these 
individuals, 11,780 participants remained in the final sample. Individuals who were 
excluded: failed to complete the survey, provided repetitive or inappropriate 
responses to attention filler items, completed the survey more than once, or completed 
the survey in an usually short amount of time. In this final sample 10,723 participants 
were non-victims, 728 were one-off victims and 329 were repeat victims. All 
participants stated that they had been exposed to an online scam online. The mean age 
of the sample was 48.5 years (SD = 16.3), ranging from 18-93 years. Overall, 37% of 
the sample was men and 63% women. With regard to the highest level of education 
achieved by participants: 1.4% had a doctoral degree, 8.3% had a Masters degree, 
29.5% had an undergraduate degree, 29.3% had A levels, 27.6% held GCSE 
qualification and 3.9% had less than high school qualifications.  
 
 2.2 Materials 
Data were collected using a questionnaire hosted on the Qualtrics online survey 
platform. The questionnaire consisted of personality inventories as well as items 
devised to measure demographic descriptive data, routine activities and online 
guardianship behaviours. Those who had been scammed were also asked to describe 
the type of cyber fraud/s they has been tricked by and as a consequence lost money. 
Impulsivity was measured using the UPPS-R Impulsivity Scale (Whiteside & Lynam, 
2001). The 45-item scale measures a person’s tendency to act on whim, displaying 
behaviours characterised by little forethought or consideration of the consequences of 
their actions. The scale comprises four subscales: lack of premeditation (11 items), 
urgency (12 items), sensation seeking (12 items) and lack of perseverance (10 items). 
Possible scores range from 11 to 44 for the lack of premeditation subscale, from 12 to 
48 for both the urgency and sensation seeking subscales, and from 10 to 40 for the 
lack of perseverance subscale. A lower score indicates low impulsivity for that 
dimension. In the current study, all of the subscales demonstrated good internal 
consistency (Cronbach’s alpha =.86, .91, .89, .83 for lack of premeditation, urgency, 
sensation seeking and lack of perseverance, respectively). 
 
Locus of control was measured using the Internal-External Locus of Control scale 
(Rotter, 1966). The 29-item scale measures a person’s general tendency for an 
internal or external locus of control. For each item on the scale, participants indicate 
which of two statements they agree with most. Possible scores range from 0 to 23, 
with a lower score indicating a more internal locus of control insofar as a participant 
believes that everyday events are contingent on his or her own behaviour. In the 
 current study, the study demonstrated acceptable internal consistency (Cronbach’s 
alpha =.65). 
Addictive disposition was measured using the Eysenk Personality 
Questionnaire (EPQ-A). Acceptable internal consistency was obtained for this scale 
(Cronbach’s alpha =.68). There are 32 dichotomous items in the EPQ-A scale, with 
possible scores ranging from 0 to 32. A high score equates with high addictive 
disposition. 
Routine activities included items on frequency of the following online 
activities: Instant messaging, posting pictures, posting messages, streaming media, 
shopping online and banking online. Participants were also asked a question on online 
guardianship: how frequently they viewed consumer advice sites, for example, fraud 
alerts, Which magazine). For each of these items participants were presented with 5-
point Likert scales with 1 = never and 5 = several times a day. Non-victims were 
asked to answer these questions considering the last 6 months, one-off victims were 
asked to consider 6 months prior to the scam and repeat victims were asked to answer 
6 months prior to the last scam they were taken in by. 
An exploratory Factor Analysis was performed on all routine activities items, 
except for the online guardianship question. Before subjecting the scale to principle 
axis factoring the data were assessed to ensure suitability for analysis and it was 
found that none of the assumptions were violated. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olken measure 
of sampling adequacy was .75 which exceeded the recommended lowest value of .6. 
The Barlett’s Test of Sphericity also reached statistical significance, supporting the 
factorability of the correlation matrix. Principal axis factoring revealed the presence 
of 2 components with eigenvalues exceeding 1. Together they accounted for 60.71% 
of the total variance (42.86% and 17.85%, respectively). Inspection of the scree plot 
 confirmed 2 factors. Direct Oblimin separated these components obliquely, which 
allows for the possibility of intercorrelation among factors. All items exceeded 
loadings of .4 and therefore they were all considered for further analysis. The rotated 
factor solution took 4 iterations to produce and is reported in Table 1. Factor 1 was 
labelled ‘Exposing online activities’ and Factor 2 was labelled ‘Risky online spaces’. 
Factor based scales were generated by obtained regression scores. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
2.3 Procedure 
Participants were recruited via a ‘Qualtrics’ online panel. Qualtrics recruited a 
random sample from its large panel of UK participants. Participants were asked to 
complete a series of socio-demographic questions (e.g., age, gender, education), 
personality items (e.g., impulsivity, locus of control, addiction disposition) and 
whether they had been scammed by a cyber-fraud. Participants were all asked a series 
of questions about routine activities and whether they had ever come across a cyber-
scam. They were also asked if they had been defrauded by more than one cyber-fraud. 
They were also asked questions about the type of cyber-fraud. 
 
3. Results 
3.1 Bivariate associations 
Bivariate associations between the independent variables were first examined (see 
Table 2). Most correlations were moderate to low. Correlations of note include those 
between: age and exposure online (Pearson’s r = -.533), urgency and addiction 
(Pearson’s r = .497), exposure online activities and risky online spaces (Pearson’s r = 
.617), and risky online spaces and online guardianship (Pearson’s r = .433). 
 Unsurprisingly, many of the correlations between subsets of impulsivity were 
moderate and ranged from Pearson’s r  = -.290 to .497. 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
3.2 Relationship between personality and socio-demographic characteristics with 
routine activities 
First, statistically significant relationships between personality (impulsivity, locus of 
control and addictive disposition) and socio-demographic characteristics (age, gender 
and education) with routine activities (‘exposing online activities’, ‘risky online 
places’ and ‘online guardianship’) were investigated.  
Prior to running the analysis it was found that the assumptions were met in 
order to run simultaneous forced entry multiple regressions. It is also noted that there 
were no issues with multicollinearity given that VIF levels were less than 2. The total 
variance of the model examining ‘exposing online activities’ was 34.5%, F (9, 11700) 
= 689.54, p < .001 (see Table 3). The total variance of the model explaining ‘risky 
online spaces’ was 15.1%, F (9, 11700) = 232.08, p < .001 (see Table 4). The total 
variance of the model explaining ‘ online guardianship’ was 7%, F (9, 11700) = 
99.524, p < .001 (see Table 5).  
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
As shown in the tables these findings demonstrate that psychological and 
socio-demographic characteristics are associated with routine activities. Notably, 
younger people were more likely to engage in routine activities that potentially 
expose them to cyber-frauds and older people were more likely to engage in online 
guardianship behaviours. Educated people were more likely to engage in routine 
 activities that potentially expose them to cyber-frauds and were more likely to engage 
in online guardianship behaviours. Those who scored higher on the impulsivity sub-
scales urgency and sensation seeking, and high on addiction were more likely to 
engage in routine activities that potentially expose them to cyber-frauds and were 
more likely to engage in online guardianship behaviours. In contrast, those who 
scored low on the impulsivity subscale, lack of perseverance, and low on external 
locus of control were more likely to engage in routine activities that potentially 
expose them to cyber-frauds and were more likely to engage in online guardianship 
behaviours.  
 
3.3 Predictors of cyber-fraud victimhood 
Hypotheses 1-4 were next examined. Given that a statistical relationship was revealed 
for personality, socio-demographic variables and routine activities, these were 
initially considered in separate models before considering them in a combined model. 
Three binary logistic regressions models were therefore conducted (see Tables 6-8). 
Given gender was found to be a weak predictor of routine activities and there were no 
gender hypotheses developed to predict victimhood, gender was not examined in 
these models. Model 1 examined the psychological characteristics examined in the 
previous regression analyses with the exception of gender. Model 2 examined the 
routine activities examined in the previous regression analyses. Model 3 was the 
saturated model, which included both psychological characteristics and routine 
activities. 
INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE 
INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE 
 Model 1 was significant, with a good fit to the data, (χ2(8, N = 11,780) = 536.90, p 
<.001), (Nagelkerke R2 = .098). Model 2 was significant, with a good fit to the data, 
(χ2(3, N = 11,780) = 395.80, p <.001), (Nagelkerke R2 = .073). Model 3 was 
significant, with an improved fit to the data, (χ2(11, N = 11,780) = 685.05, p <.001), 
(Nagelkerke R2 = .125). Notably, all predicator variables were significant in all 
models, with the exception of lack of perseverance. The saturated model was a better 
fit and none of the psychological characteristics dropped out of the model. 
Furthermore, although the predictors, education, lack of perseverance, locus of 
control and guardianship were significant, they were in the opposite direction to what 
was hypothesised. 
Finally, any differences between one-off victimhood and repeat victimhood 
were examined (H5). This was carried out using a multinominal logistic regression, 
including both psychological characteristics and routine activities in the model, with 
one-off victimhood as the reference category (Table 9). The model was significant, 
χ2(22, N = 11,780) = 727.28, p <.001), (Nagelkerke R2 = .117). When considering 
non-victims and one-off victims, most of the predictor variables were significant with 
the exception of lack of perseverance. Furthermore, although the predictors, 
education, lack of premeditation, locus of control and online guardianship were 
significant, they were in the opposite direction to what was hypothesised. When 
considering one-off victims and repeat victims very little separated these groups, 
except for online guardianship, which was in the opposite direction to what was 
predicted. 
INSERT TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE 
 
4. Discussion 
 Cyber-fraud is a crime that is on the increase, and one that affects digital technology 
users across the globe. This research found that all participants in this sample had 
been exposed to a cyber-fraud at some point in their lives and 7% of the sample had 
lost money to a cyber-fraud – giving weight to the importance of this investigation. 
There is a scant amount of available literature that has examined who is more likely to 
be taken in by cyber-frauds and which online behaviours (if any) might place 
individuals at greater risk of becoming scammed. This paper moves the research 
forward by developing a susceptibility theoretical framework based on empirical 
research that uncovers key findings into the psychological and socio-demographic 
characteristics and online behaviours of cyber-fraud victims. 
 
4.1 Susceptibility theoretical framework 
Much of the previous research on cyber-fraud (of which there are still few studies) 
has focused on the types of people and the routine activities of those who are targeted 
(e.g., Pratt et al., 2010). Research that has examined predictors of victimhood has 
typically considered personal dispositions (e.g., Buchanan & Whitty, 2014) or routine 
activities (e.g., Reyns, 2015) in isolation. The work here demonstrates that a 
susceptibility to cyber-fraud framework needs to include: personality and socio-
demographic characteristics, exposing online activities, risky online spaces and online 
guardianship behaviours. Combining psychological theories of individuals differences 
and criminological theories of routine activities is essential if scholars are to further 
their understandings of why individuals are tricked by cyber-scams as well is in the 
development of methodologies to prevent these types of crimes. 
This study found that most of the psychological characteristics predicted 
online routine activities – both risky activities and online guardianship activities. 
 However, although certain types of people are more likely to place themselves at risk 
and protect themselves (which in itself is important to understand), the saturated 
model found that both psychological characteristics and routine activities are 
important to consider when predicting victimhood. Therefore, it is proposed here that 
a predictive model for cyber-fraud victimhood needs to include socio-demographic 
characteristics, personality traits and online routine behaviours. 
Most of the predictor variables proposed in this study were significant; 
however, they were not all significant in the direction hypothesised. The research 
supported the hypotheses that age, some of the impulsive sub-categories (urgency and 
sensation seeking), addiction and the risky online behaviours (exposure and risky 
places) significantly predicted victimhood. Significant predictors in the opposite 
direction to what was predicted included: education, lack of premeditation, locus of 
control and online guardianship behaviours. 
The explanation for why educated people are more likely to be scammed by 
these types of scams might be explained in a number of ways. Although education 
was significant in the saturated model where routine activities were also included 
(meaning that education still made a significant contribution to the model in spite of 
this variable significantly predicting routine activities) it might be that there are other 
online routine activities that educated people engage in that place them at risk that 
were not considered in the research (see for example, van Deursen & Dijk, 2014; 
Estacio, Whittle & Protheroe, 2017, in press, for a discussion on how educated people 
use the Internet differently compared with less educated people). An alternative 
explanation can be offered by drawing from the work of Lea at al. (2009). Lea and 
colleagues theorised that overconfidence in the ability to recognise scams places 
people at greater risk of becoming scammed as they hold a ‘belief of invulnerability’. 
 Educated people might be more likely to be more likely to hold the view that they can 
spot a scam, and thereby spend less efforts seeking out persuasion and deception cues. 
Counter to the hypotheses, those who were more likely to be premeditative 
and have a high internal locus of control were more likely to be scammed. Although 
this finding is counter-intuitive, this suggests that cyber-fraud victims do not 
recognise the control others might have over them and as a consequence are pulled 
into a scam – with the false belief that they are in control. These findings might also 
suggest that spending time considering one’s actions online is not, in itself, protective. 
Further research might consider which cues individuals’ believe signal a scam and 
whether individuals are able to correctly discern authentic material from scammer 
material (e.g., profiles, advertisements, emails). 
Perhaps the most interesting and important finding here is that online 
guardianship behaviours did not protect individuals from becoming scammed. In fact, 
the opposite finding was revealed in this study with one-off victims more likely to 
engage in online guardianship behaviours compared with non-victims and repeat 
victims more likely to engage in guardianship behaviours compared with one-off 
victims. The finding might be interpreted in a number of ways. Engaging in online 
guardianship behaviours might be exposing individuals more to scams/scammers 
and/or the sites that present information on how to protect individuals from scams 
does not communicate this information effectively. This final point is not trivial, 
given the criticisms that are often made of fraud information sites. As Sasse and 
Smith (2016) contend, useful cybersecurity advice needs to be both correct and 
actionable. Moreover, given that, as this study found, victims are typically impulsive, 
information might need to be written succinctly so that users can easily and quickly 
 digest the details needed to change their behaviours. It might be useful to provide 
more engaging and interactive advice to capture and hold users’ attention. 
When considering repeat victimisation it is noteworthy that there were no 
significant distinguishing psychological or socio-demographic characteristics between 
one-off victims and repeat victims. In this sample, 45% of cyber-fraud victims were 
repeat victims. This finding highlights an urgent need to develop effective 
preventative strategies for this group. Alarmingly, the only variable that predicted 
whether someone was a repeat or a one-off victim was their likelihood to read e-
safety websites. Although more research is needed to understand this finding – at face 
value, at least, this suggests that e-safety websites need to improve on the content and 
possibly presenting of information placed on these sites.   
 
5. Conclusion 
The findings in this paper provide new insights into the types of people and routine 
behaviours that place individuals at greater risk of becoming scammed. The work here 
suggests that any approach to preventing scam victimhood needs to consider: socio-
demographic, personality and routine activities together and that a routine activity 
approach or personality approach alone is not sufficient.  
The work here has implications for the design of websites (e.g., shopping 
sites, dating sites etc.). Given that victims tend to be those who score high on urgency 
and sensation seeking – safer guards might be built into the design where users are 
forced to carry out their own checks (and/or the sites carry out further checks) prior 
to: engaging with someone on the site to date, discuss a job opportunity, purchase an 
item, etc. Moreover, advice on these sites needs to be upfront, easily accessible and 
provide useful and correct advice. 
 There are some important policy implications that governments should 
consider as a result of this study. The findings here suggest that government and other 
educational sites built to prevent scams are a hindrance rather than helpful. As 
previous research has found (e.g., Junger, Montoya & Overink, 2017), priming and 
warnings are not also effective to prevent social engineering attacks and so work is 
urgently needed on how to improve cyber security educational websites. Developers 
need to be mindful that their cites need to cater for a range of different types of users, 
using effective messaging and visualisations (e.g., Moreno-Fernández, Blanco, 
Garaizar & Matute, 2017). Moreover, given that impulsive individuals are more 
susceptible to becoming scammed, information needs to be concise, easily accessible, 
engaging and actionable. Simply informing users that particular scams exist might not 
change cybersecurity behaviour and instead sites might give practical advice on what 
users need to do to protect themselves, which cues to pay attention to that might 
indicate a scam, what checks are required and how to go about conducting these 
checks. 
In conclusion, this research provides important evidence that supports the 
notion that socio-demographics and psychological characteristics and routine 
activities predict victimhood. Future research might examine routine activities in 
greater detail and might examine the ways individuals go about discerning between 
authentic and disingenuous scammer content.  
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